PIERCING THE FOG OF WAR: The Theory and Practice of Command in the British and German Armies, 1918-1940

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Since the late 1970s, anglophone and German military literature has been fascinated by the Wehrmacht's command system, especially the practice of Auftragstaktik. There have been many descriptions of the doctrine, and examinations of its historical origins, as well as unflattering comparisons with the approaches of the British and American armies prior to their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. Almost none of these, however, have sought to understand the different approaches to command in the context of a fundamental characteristic of warfare - friction. This would be like trying to understand flight, without any reference to aerodynamics. Inherently flawed, yet this is the norm in the military literature. This book seeks to address that gap. 4 b/w maps, 4 b/w diags, 14 tables

Analyzes the nature of friction and the potential command responses to it, including the development of a typology of eight command approaches, each approach then being tested to identify its relative effectiveness and requirements for success. Examines the British and German armies' doctrines of command during the period to reveal similarities and differences in relation to their perspective on the nature of warfare and the most appropriate responses. For example, this looks at the German doctrine as practiced by Erwin Rommel, both as a young subaltern fighting the Italians in 1917, and then as a newly-appointed divisional commander against the French in 1940, is used to test the expression of in practice. Finally, this explores different command doctrines with case studies of two key armored battles: Amiens in August 1918 and Arras in May 1940.